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ARTICLES 
WTO WINNERS AND LOSERS: THE TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT DISCONNECT 
MEREDrrH KOLSKY LEWIS* 
"There must be somethingin the piefor everyone. Notpie in thesky when we die, 
butpie on the table.' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization ("WTO" or the "Organization") is 
premised upon increasing prosperity by opening markets to greater 
trade flows. 2 Although the goals of the Organization include enhanc-
ing development and reducing poverty, thus far the WTO has had 
difficulty bridging the gap between its trade expansion focus-
exemplified by members' substantive commitments to provide greater 
access to their markets-and its desire to promote development-largely 
framed in aspirational, nonbinding terms. This article explains why 
current measures to assist developing countries ("DCs") 3 are not a 
complete solution to the trade and development disconnect. It further 
proposes using the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as the basis for a 
framework under which the WTO's trade and development aims could 
be pursued in a more integrated fashion by adopting a direct or 
indirect compensation mechanism. 
Historically the WTO has concentrated its negotiations on issues of 
market access and not on development direcdy. This reflects an 
underlying assumption that the rising tide will raise all boats-that 
liberalizing markets alone will make all WTO members better off. 
* Senior Lecturer, Victoria University of Wellington Law School. meredith.lewis@vuw.ac.nz. 
I owe thanks to Graeme AustinJane Bradley, Susy Frankel, Simon Lester, and Bryan Mercurio for 
their helpful comments and feedback on the ideas expressed in this article. © 2007, Meredith 
Kolsky Lewis. 
1. Mike Moore, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Address at the Conference of African Trade 
Ministers: Africa and the Multilateral Trading System: Challenges and Opportunities, (Sept. 23, 
1999) availableathttp://www.wto.org/english/news e/spmm_e/spmmO7_e.htm. 
2. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (objectives of raising standards 
of living and increasing real income to be attained "by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade..."). 
3. This article uses "DCs"to refer to both least developed countries ("LDCs") and developing 
countries. "LDCs" is used to refer solely to least developed countries. 
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However, this assumption is flawed. Trade liberalization, while wealth-
generating in the aggregate, does not necessarily lead to greater wealth 
for each participant. Instead, the multilateral trading system thus far 
has resulted in winners and losers, and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.4 The WTO's stated objective of ensuring that all 
WTO members benefit from the system cannot be met unless and until 
the WTO institutionalizes measures to systemically ensure that the 
losers also become winners. Increasing the number of members benefit-
ing from the world trading system would do more than just meet the 
aspirational goals of the WATO. Members would benefit from increased 
volumes of trade and thus greater overall wealth would be generated 
within the membership. And from a pragmatic standpoint, more steps 
should be taken to help the losers as these members have the ability to 
hamstring further progress in the Doha Round and any future rounds.5 
Therefore, it would behoove the membership to take steps to ensure 
the Organization's policies are in the best interests of all the members. 
As a result of the assumption that trade liberalization benefits all 
participants, DCs' requests for special and differential treatment or 
other forms of assistance have been treated as an obstacle or stumbling 
block that needs to be addressed in order to get agreement on the 
latest round of liberalization measures. In reality however, DCs' pleas 
for differential treatment arise out of the reality that not all members 
will benefit as a result of a given round of negotiations. The degree of 
disparity is exacerbated when the negotiated outcome includes agree-
ments such as TRIPS, which impose high implementation costs on 
poorer countries, and excludes meaningful additional market access in 
areas of importance to these countries, such as agriculture. 
The recent focus within the WTO on generating funds for Aid for 
Trade and the creation of an Aid for Trade Task Force to recommend 
4. In the absence of perfect market conditions such as free movement of labor and capital, 
even free trade will not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. The present trading system is far from 
"free trade" in any event, and market conditions are imperfect. See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World 
Trade Org., Statement by the Dir.-Gen at the Roundtable on Aid for Trade: Why Aid for Trade? 
Why is the WTO Involved? And What Now (Sept. 18, 2006) (noting that many "developing 
countries have been unable to benefit from the market opening the WTO has achieved") available 
athttp://www.wto.org/english/news e/sppl e/sppl37_e.htm. 
5. See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Emile Noel Lecture at the New York 
University Law School: Making Trade Work for Development: Time for a New Geneva Consensus 
(Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Lamy-Geneva Consensus"] (noting that DCs are disadvantaged by 
some of the WTO agreements, and indicating that this bias must be rectified as it will not be 
sustainable in the long-term) available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/sppl_e/ 
spp145_e.htm. 
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ways to operationalize Aid for Trade can be seen as an effort to bridge 
the trade and development gap through providing supply side and 
capacity-building assistance to needy WTO members. The goal is to 
help these countries get the most out of the market access they have by 
enhancing their ability to export. This assistance-particularly if it is 
ultimately coupled with a successful Doha Round in which barriers to 
trade from DCs drop significantly-will certainly help countries in need 
benefit more from their WTO membership. However, Aid for Trade, as 
currently formulated, addresses only one part of the trade and develop-
ment disconnect. In particular, Aid for Trade and other measures, such 
as trade-related technical assistance and capacity building, are de-
signed to help members participate in international markets more 
successfully going forward. These measures do not, however, compen-
sate members for the losses they are currently experiencing. By anal-
ogy, the WTO provides adjustment assistance analogous to the worker 
retraining programs the United States offers to those who experience 
NAFTA-related job losses, but it is not providing the equivalent of 
unemployment benefits.6 
Even in the absence of high implementation costs, and even without 
the wealthiest countries maintaining their agricultural tariffs and subsi-
dies, there would still be winners and losers under the current interna-
tional trading system. In economic terms, the 'WTO is Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient; the system generates enough additional wealth in the aggre-
gate that the winners could compensate the losers and still be better 
off. However, that compensation does not occur in practice. Aid for 
Trade will help some of the losers be able to participate more success-
fully in the international trading system, but it cannot change the 
reality that at any given time some WTO members may not be benefit-
ing from the system.7 For example, while the removal of tariffs is good 
6. Director-General Pascal Lamy has implicitly acknowledged this distinction, at least at the 
micro level. See id. ("For the poor in such [developing] countries, losing their job as a result of 
trade reform can cause severe hardship. It is one thing to lose yourjob when you are entitled to 
unemployment benefits or to trade adjustment assistance, but it is quite another thing to become 
unemployed when this reduces your income to zero."). 
7. To be sure, many countries would be able to export more if the developed countries would 
remove agricultural subsidies and tariffs; avoid tariff escalation (schemes that disadvantage 
value-added products); and open markets without reservation to the LDCs. But even so, the 
benefits of trade are not experienced evenly. There are always going to be winners and losers. Who 
those winners and losers are may change over time with the eradication of certain preference 
schemes and changes in comparative advantage. See, e.g., SANDRA POLASKI, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE WINNERS AND LOSERS: IMPACT OF THE DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING 
CouNTrRIEs (2006) (identifying different groups of countries as winners and losers under different 
2007] 
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for domestic consumers, it can be a significant loss of revenue for 
countries such as the Pacific Island members. Similarly, changes in 
preference schemes will likely spell the end of Fiji's sugar exports. As 
free trade agreements proliferate, LDCs' preferential access is no 
longer preferential. These are just a few of many examples.' Accord-
ingly, the WTO membership needs to go beyond Aid for Trade. It 
should reorient its modus operandi to develop a mechanism whereby 
losers are more directly compensated by the winners as a part of an 
understanding that producing a bigger pie means all members must 
get a bigger slice. In particular, the Kaldor-Hicks framework provides a 
conceptual basis that the membership could adopt to harmonize its 
trade and development goals. If WTO members elected to utilize some 
of the gains from trade liberalization to compensate the members that 
are not benefiting, the institution's aims would converge rather thin 
clash. 
Part II of this article explains the trade and development disconnect 
in more detail. Part III sets forth the economic rationale underlying the 
current system and sets forth economic, moral, and pragmatic justifica-
tions for transferring some of the gains from trade from the winners to 
the losers. Part IV identifies different methods by which the WTO 
membership can minimize the need for compensation, and examines 
various issues relating to the provision of the compensation that will 
still be required. 
II. THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DISCONNECT 
When the current round of WTO negotiations was initiated at Doha, 
Qatar in 2001, it was deemed a development round and the goals for 
the round have been labeled the Doha Development Agenda ("DDA"). 
The impetus for a development-focused round was in large part the 
need to provide a form of payback to the LDCs and poorer developing 
countries for their concessions made in the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. In the Uruguay Round DCs agreed, among other things, to the 
creation of new agreements on intellectual property and services-the 
TRIPS Agreement and GATS respectively-which were primarily of 
potential Doha Round outcomes, and finding that some losers would exist under each of the 
scenarios modeled). 
8. See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Opening Remarks at the 53rd session of the 
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board meeting (Sept. 27, 2006) (noting that there may be 
scenarios where, due to domestic inefficiencies, opening a country's markets to trade could harm 
the domestic economy) availableat http://www.wto.org/english/news e/sppl e/sppl40_e.htm. 
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interest to the industrialized developed members.9 This consent was 
given with the understanding that developed countries would, in 
exchange, liberalize the textiles and agriculture sectors. DCs went into 
the Doha process angry that the promises to improve market access in 
these sectors had not been sufficiently fulfilled and resolved to get 
commitments of real benefit to them this time around. 10 
Notwithstanding the launch of the DDA six years ago, no clear 
mandate has emerged as to what specifically should and will be done to 
assist DCs. Thus while the WTO has been promoting development in 
name, in practice there is still no generally accepted framework or 
structure for undertaking this effort.1 It is no wonder therefore that 
DCs have been unimpressed with the offers on the table in the Doha 
Round negotiations thus far, and that those negotiations have repeat-
edly stalled and floundered. The impasse is in part a reflection of the 
fact that the United States and EC are not willing to sacrifice their own 
protectionist measures, and as such any statements they make regard-
ing the importance of development assistance ring hollow. The prob-
lem goes beyond the motivations of individual members though, as it 
would be in the interests of the United States and EC for poorer 
members to wholeheartedly embrace the WTO and to have the purchas-
ing power to buy more American and European products. Instead 
there is a disconnect whereby the WTO is talking the talk of develop-
ment-and where substantively advancing development would actually 
benefit all members-but the Organization does not seem to know how 
to translate the rhetoric into appropriate action. 
In a recent article, Tomer Broude identifies a possible reason for this 
disconnect. He argues that the WTO has legitimacy by virtue of its 
success in increasing market access opportunities for exporters-what 
9. DCs are more likely to have a comparative advantage in imitating than in innovating. The 
TRIPS Agreement, by raising the minimum level of intellectual property protection to that 
maintained by the developed countries, arguably advantages the developed country innovators at 
the expense of the developing country imitators. See, e.g. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, RethinkingInternational 
Trade, 19 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 347, 364 (1998). 
10. See, e.g., Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformation:The WTO as a DistributiveOrganization,17 
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1045, 1051 (2002);Joseph E. Stiglitz, Trade and the Developing World: A New 
Agenda, 98 CURRENT HISTORY 387, 387-93 (1999);Joseph E. Stiglitz, The WTO Millenium Round, 3 
SocIAL DEVEL. REV. 6, 6-9 (1999) (documenting imbalances of the Uruguay Round and calling for 
a Development Round to redress them). 
11. To be sure, the agenda includes areas of interest to DCs including improving market 
access and terminating agricultural export subsidies. But these are agenda items, not attempts to 
institutionalize a framework for ensuring positive outcomes for all members. 
2007] 
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he terms "functional legitimacy."12 However, the WTO has recently 
engaged in a significant shift in institutional focus towards develop-
ment goals. He argues that the WTO hasn't figured out how to adapt its 
functional dimension-that being the traditional expanding market 
access focus-to meet its aspirational dimension-that being to promote
1 3 
development. 
Broude's point can be illustrated through a number of examples. 
The first lies within the WTO legal texts themselves. In the Preamble of 
the Marrakesh Agreement creating the WTO, the signatories recognize 
the need "for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing coun-
tries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in 
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of 
their economic development." 14 While this language implies an under-
standing that market forces alone will not be sufficient to ensure the 
poorest countries benefit from trade liberalization, the Preamble goes 
on to indicate that the parties to the Agreement wish to "contribut[e] 
to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advanta-
geous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treat-
ment in international trade relations." 15 The Preamble notably does 
not provide any additional explanation for how DCs will come to 
benefit, suggesting that while Members are not opposed in principleto 
taking affirmative steps to help countries reap benefits from increased 
trade, in practice the underlying assumption has been that the trade 
liberalization alone will effect the desired benefits. 
The 2005 Consultative Board Report "The Future of the WTO" is 
another case in point. Then-WTO Director-General Supachai Panitch-
pakdi commissioned a group of trade experts to undertake a review of 
the institutional structure of the WTO and to report on its strengths 
and weaknesses, particularly identifying any problem areas that should 
be addressed. 16 The resulting Report, which is over 60 pages long, 
makes only a few references to "developing countries," and one gets the 
impression that the Board-has shied away from addressing the implica-
12. Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) ofTradeandthe RhetosofDevelopment: Reflectionson theFunctional 
andAspirationalLegitimay ofthe WT0, 45 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 221, 227 (2006). 
13. Id. 
14. Marrakesh Agreement, supranote 2 (emphasis added). 
15. Id. 
16. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Forewordto Consultative Board, The 
Futureof the WTO: AddressingInstitutionalChallenges in the New Millenium 2, 2-3 (2004) [hereinafter 
Consultative Board Report]. 
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tions of the WTO's development aims. 
1 7 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the current Round's stated focus on 
development, it is incongruous that the WTO has not made any official 
mention of the United Nations ("U.N.") Millennium Declaration or its 
associated Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs").18 These eight 
goals target areas, such as eradicating hunger and poverty, in which to 
achieve significant improvements by 2015.'9 One of the goals is to 
"[D]evelop a global partnership for development."20 The November 
2001 Doha Declaration failed to acknowledge the MDGs, 21 as did the 
Hong Kong Ministerial, even in the context of discussing the Aid for 
Trade initiative.22 Yet the U.N. itself considers the WTO as one of the 
keys to achieving this goal. In the U.N.'s 2005 progress report on the 
MDGs, the potential promise to DCs of the Doha Development Round-
and the slow progress thus far-is explicitly discussed.23 Similarly, in his 
2005 report "In Larger Freedom," U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
linked the ability to meet the MDGs by 2015 with, among other needs, 
"a new development-oriented trade round."24 Yet the WTO has not, for 
its part, acknowledged any link between the DDA (or the VTO more 
generally) and the MDGs. 
Following the disastrous ministerials in Seattle and Cancun, and only 
minor progress in Hong Kong, the developing country members have 
made clear that existing programs25 are insufficient to meet their 
17. See id.; Donald McRae, Developing Countries and 'TheFuture of the WTO, 8J. INT'L ECON. L. 
603, 603-04 (2005). 
18. See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organizationin 2020, 1 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 167, 
178 (2005) (noting the lack of acknowledgement by the WTO of the Millenium Declaration as of 
early 2005); United Nations Millenium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
19. United Nations Millenium Declaration, supranote 18. 
20. For a full list of the MDGs, see UN Millennium Development Goals, available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
21. See Charnovitz, supra note 18, at 178. 
22. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN (05)/ 
DEC. The first report of the Aid for Trade Task Force does make brief mention of the MDGs. See 
Aid for Trade Task Force, Recommendations of the Task Force on Aid for Trade,WT/AFT/1 (July 27, 
2006). 
23. U.N. Dep't ofEcon. & Soc. Aff. & U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., MillenniumDevelopment Goals: 
Progress Chart, U.N. Doc. DPI/2363/Rev. 2 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.un.org/ 
millenniumgoals/mdg-chart-sept.pdf. 
24. The Secretary-General, In LargerFreedom: TowardsDevelopment, Security and Human Rights 
forAll, 32, deliveredto the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
25. Such as the Integrated Framework and Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program, 
both discussed in Part IV, infra. 
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needs. Attention in the WTO is now being given-both within and 
outside the context of the current trade liberalization negotiations-as 
to how to address the concerns of the members that are currently 
recognizing the least benefits from trade. At the same time, the broader 
community of international financial institutions has recognized the 
magnitude of the benefits poorer countries would realize if they were 
able to trade more, and more effectively. This recognition has led to 
new efforts to increase funding for trade and development projects in 
the form of the Aid for Trade movement. 
The WTO's uncertainty over how to reconcile its goals is further 
illustrated by its confusion over how to participate in Aid for Trade 
efforts. Unlike the hands-off approach taken with respect to the MDGs, 
the WTO initially plunged headlong into the Aid for Trade process, 
seemingly attempting to determine how to participate in Aid for 
Trade's substantive operations. It is appropriate and desirable for the 
WTO to marshal efforts to attract contributions for Aid for Trade and 
to provide relevant data generated through its existing trade policy 
review and other mechanisms. However, it does not make much sense 
for the WTO to attempt to determine what projects should be funded 
and to what degree given the WTO's lack of institutional capacity or 
mandate to provide substantive development assistance. 
Although Aid for Trade does not seem to have a single definition, it 
generally appears to encompass traditional trade-related capacity build-
ing as well as more expansive forms of assistance directed at improving 
countries' trade-related infrastructure and other supply-side capaci-
ties.26 The movement to greatly enhance funding for Aid for Trade 
gained momentum in early 2005, first with the G-7 calling for addi-
tional assistance for DCs, then with the OECD committing to improve 
aid quality, and in April 2005 with the World Bank and IMF issuing a 
joint note on a plan for Aid for Trade. Although Aid for Trade does not 
encompass anything new in terms of the types of projects funded by aid 
agencies and international financial institutions,27 historically the WTO 
has not been involved in such efforts beyond the narrow scope of 
trade-related technical assistance and training. The WTO became 
formally involved in Aid for Trade (as more broadly defined) in late 
2005, when Director-General Lamy pledged to work with the IMF and 
World Bank to advance an Aid for Trade initiative in 2006. The Hong 
26. See, e.g., Aid for Trade Task Force, Communicationfrom the Bank Integrationand Regional 
ProgrammesDepartment,at 2, WT/AFT/W/13 (May 11, 2006). 
27. See id. 
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Kong Ministerial welcomed the expansion of Aid for Trade and autho-
rized the Director-General to create a task force to provide recommen-
dations on how to operationalize Aid for Trade. Further, the Ministe-
rial directed that: 
Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, particu-
larly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related 
infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and 
benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand 
their trade. Aid for Trade cannot be a substitute for the 
development benefits that will result from a successful conclu-
sion to the DDA, particularly on market access. However, it can 
be a valuable complement to the DDA... We also invite the 
Director-General to consult with Members as well as with the 
IMF and World Bank, relevant international organisations and 
the regional development banks with a view to reporting to the 
General Council on appropriate mechanisms to secure addi-
tional financial resources for Aid for Trade, where appropriate 
through grants and concessional loans.28 
In February 2006 the WTO duly launched an Aid for Trade Task 
Force, comprising thirteen members including the United States, EC, 
Japan, India, China, Brazil, and coordinators of the ACP, African 
Group, and LDC Group.2 9 The Task Force was asked to provide 
recommendations to the General Council byJuly 2006 on: 
1) How Aid for Trade can best contribute to the development 
dimensions of the Doha Development Agenda; 
2) How to operationalize Aid for Trade; and 
3) How to help developing countries address their supply-side 
constraints, in order, in the words of Director-General Lamy, 
"to translate the market access gains they make from the Doha 
Round, from theoretical into real commercial possibilities. 
' 30 
28. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of December 2005, 57, WT/ 
MIN(05)/DEC. 
29. The Task Force comprises: Barbados, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, the European 
Union, Japan, India, Thailand, the United States and the coordinators of the ACP, the African 
Group and the LDC Group. The Permanent Representative of Sweden, ambassador Mia Horn Af 
Rantzien, chairs the Task Force ad personam. 
30. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Address at the 5th Munich Economic Summit: 
Europe and the New Division of Labour, (May 2, 2006) availableathttp://www.wto.org/english/ 
news-e/sppl-e/spp124_e.htm. 
2007] 
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The expectations for the Task Force were unrealistically high, particu-
larly given that the WTO has not yet come to terms with how to fulfil its 
development goals. In a period of only five months, the Task Force was 
expected "to provide concrete and results-oriented proposals to fulfil 
its objectives. " " In practice, the Task Force has generated some 
recommendations that do not go particularly far in terms of concrete 
proposals and do not do much in the way of answering the three 
questions posed by the Director-General. In fact, the Task Force's 
nine-page report concludes with the suggestion that, after completion 
of the Doha Development Agenda, the "[S]ecretariat conduct an 
assessment of associated Aid-for-Trade needs in developing countries, 
particularly those most affected, including LDCs, and of how Aid for 
Trade can contribute to the development dimension of the DDA."3 2 The Task 
Force thus recommended precisely the assessment it itself had been 
tasked with providing, suggesting that the process has done no more 
than come full circle. 
The specifics of the recommendations give no real sense that there is 
a coherent plan in mind for what the WTO's role should be in the Aid 
for Trade process. The recommendations outline numerous actions 
that should be taken by entities other than the WTO, such as "Urge 
donors and agencies together with regional banks and organizations, 
to step up their efforts to identify regional, sub-regional and cross-
border needs, including those related to regional integration ''3 3 and 
"Donors and agencies should ...use needs assessment processes ... 
and their results, as a basis for their programming."34 These are not 
isolated examples. One is left wondering in what ways the Task Force 
thinks it can provide expertise on such issues beyond that existing 
within the organizations that specialize in providing development 
assistance. 
Similarly, the generality of the recommendations do not provide 
much in the way of tangible, focused, next steps. There are a very few 
suggestions directly linked to the WTO. These include having a global 
periodic review of Aid for Trade to be convened by a monitoring body 
within the WTO, with reports to be provided at the country, donor, 
regional, multilateral agency, and private sector levels and holding an 
31. Press Release, World Trade Org., Composition of Aid for Trade Task Force announced 
(Feb. 8, 2006), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/news.e/presO6-e/pr434_e.htm. 
32. Aid for Trade Task Force, Recommendations of the Task Force on Aid for Trade, at 9, 
WT/AFT/1 (July 27, 2006) (emphasis added). 
33. Id. at 4. 
34. Id. at 5. 
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annual debate on Aid for Trade in the WTO General Council "to give 
political guidance on Aid for Trade."3 5 With respect to the first sugges-
tion, while it will clearly be necessary and useful to review Aid for Trade 
on a regular basis, it is entirely unclear why the WTO-rather than the 
World Bank, for example-would be the competent body to monitor the 
overall efforts. The recommendations do not suggest that the WTO 
administer the aid, determine who will receive the aid, nor play the 
primary role in deciding what aid is needed. These actions are presum-
ably (though the recommendations are unclear about this) going to be 
undertaken primarily by other agencies and organizations. The motiva-
tion for the second suggestion likely is to demonstrate a willingness to 
be transparent, but the proposal itself does not provide a substantive 
role for the WTO. Perhaps the most tangible proposal for substantive 
action by the WTO that does not also require significant work by other, 
more competent bodies, is the recommendation that WTO Trade 
Policy Reviews should include assessments of Aid for Trade from the 
donor or recipient standpoint as appropriate.36 This suggestion makes 
good sense and is consistent with the actions the WTO already under-
takes. 
Although the report recognizes that the "scope for Aid for Trade 
should be defined in a way that is both broad enough to reflect the 
diverse trade needs identified by countries, and clear enough to 
establish a border between Aid for Trade and other development 
assistance of which it is a part" 7 the recommendations themselves do 
not make the distinction particularly clearly. For example, trade-
related infrastructure "including physical infrastructure" and "building 
productive capacity" are deemed to be areas that should be reported as 
Aid for Trade "when these activities have been explicitly identified as 
trade-related priorities in the recipient country's national development 
strategies, such as the [Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers] PRSP."38 
These seem to be fairly arbitrary distinctions, and ones that will not be 
consistent among countries. 
If the Recommendations have served a valuable purpose, it has 
perhaps been to make Pascal Lamy realize that Aid for Trade needs to 
be managed by the development community and that the WTO has its 
own, different work to take care of. In a recent speech to the World 
Bank-IMF Development Committee, Lamy stated that the "WTO's role 
35. Id. at 8. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 2. 
38. Id. 
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in Aid for Trade is predominantly one of advocacy for additional 
resources and enhanced coordination both at the multilateral level and 
at the domestic level in the case of beneficiary countries."39 He went on 
to say that when WTO Members meet in October to consider the 
recommendations of the Aid for Trade Task Force, "I expect their 
consideration of any institutional role for the WATO on Aid for Trade to 
focus on monitoring, using our Trade Policy Review process for ex-
ample. No direct development assistance role is foreseen for the 
WTO. ''40 This significant backtracking from the February 2006 man-
date to the Aid for Trade Task Force should be seen as a positive 
development. The WTO should not be in the business of trying to do 
the substantive work of aid agencies, though it should be fully support-
ive of those agencies' efforts. However, while the WTO should not be 
providing direct development assistance, it can and should do more 
within the framework ofits own competence to assist members through, 
for example, enhanced trade-related technical assistance.41 
These examples reflect the fact that the WTO's current approaches 
are not succeeding in reconciling its functional and aspirational ideals. 
Some may, as an initial matter, question why, if "the rising tide raises all 
boats," there is a need for a separate development agenda at all. 
However, evocative though the expression may be, it does not accu-
rately describe the outcomes of trade liberalization across the WTO 
membership. In reality, the international trade regime as presently 
constituted does not raise all boats. To be sure, removing tariffs and 
facilitating cross-border trade does result in more global wealth. The 
overall pie is bigger. But a bigger pie does not mean all members are 
getting a bigger slice or even as big a slice as before. A variety of 
factors-ranging from the most developed countries successfully push-
ing an agenda in the Uruguay Round that preferenced industrialized 
country interests over those of the poorer members, to the inability of 
many LDCs to take advantage of improved market access-exacerbates 
this problem. But even absent such factors, the international trading 
regime still would not have the full employment and costless movement 
of labor necessary to make the principles of comparative advantage 
fully operable.42 Thus at any given time some member countries are 
39. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., WTO to Pressfor Additional Aid-for-Trade 
Resources (Sept. 18, 2006) availableat http://www.wto.org/english/newse/sppl_e/sppl36_e.htm. 
40. Id. 
41. Seepart III, infra. 
42. See, e.g., Sara Dillon, A Farewellto "Linkage".InternationalTrade Law and GlobalSustainability 
Indicators, 55 RUrGERS L. REv. 87, 112 (2002) (discussing Ricardo's theory of comparative 
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not being made better off-and could even be worse off-than they were 
before.43 In other words, globalization is not what economists would 
call Pareto-efficient, meaning that an outcome has been achieved 
whereby no participant can be made better offwithout making another 
participant worse off. Nonetheless, going ahead and taking the actions 
that increase the size of the pie can still be rationalized because doing 
so is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, meaning that the gains are such that the 
winners could-and should-compensate the losers and still be better 
4 
off. 
III. GOING BEYOND KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY AND THE INVISIBLE HAND4 5 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has primarily been discussed in the context 
of an individual country choosing to liberalize trade. In this regard, 
there is an understanding that while some will be made worse off within 
the country, overall wealth will rise and the government can use some 
of this increased wealth to compensate the losers. There has been little 
discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency outside of the domestic context. 
However, winners and losers exist not only within each country, but in 
the international arena as well.46 This article argues that the concept of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency should be applied in the international context 
to examine how to address trade liberalization inequalities that arise at 
the macro level. 
While some countries have done quite well as a result of trade 
liberalization, others, particularly some of the least developed coun-
tries and some of the smallest countries such as the Pacific Island WTO 
advantage as being primarily theoretical and inappropriate to rely upon given the absence of the 
perfect conditions necessary for the theory to hold). 
43. This article does not attempt to canvass the economic data to determine the extent to 
which particular countries have been advantaged or disadvantaged. However, it is not hard to 
imagine that if the WTO's poorer members took steps to implement the TRIPS and SPS 
Agreements these members might well view the WTO Agreements as having a net negative effect. 
One real-life example invoked by Director-General Lamy involved cashew nut farmers in Mozam-
bique. The gains resulting from liberalization of this sector were almost entirely offset-save for 
approximately $5 per year per farm-by the costs associated with increased unemployment 
amongst the nut processors. See Lamy - Geneva Consensus, supranote 5 at 6. 
44. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency merely requires the gains to be such that the winners could 
compensate the losers and still be better off; it does not require that compensation actually occur. 
This is often referred to as the potential Pareto principle. 
45. ADAM SMiTH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(Regnery Publishing, Inc. 1998) (1776). 
46. The focus of this article is on winners and losers at the international level, rather than on 
how individual countries address disparities within their borders arising from trade liberalization. 
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members,47 have not necessarily seen gains from trade and could even 
be worse off at various times. 48 This is not because trade is inherently 
negative-though the conclusion of trade agreements with high imple-
mentation costs such as the TRIPS and SPS Agreements has exacer-
bated the problem-but is simply because the gains from trade are 
realized unevenly among countries just as they are within countries.49 
This does not mean that the situation is acceptable or even tolerable. 
All WTO members have signed on with the understanding that the 
liberalization is going to be to all members' benefit. This does not 
happen simply through letting the market work its magic. And it 
certainly does not happen when the negotiated agreements are not 
actually trade-liberalizing.5" But we tolerate this because we tell our-
selves that the overall pie is bigger and therefore that is good. But it is 
only good if everyone gets a bigger piece of the pie than before. That 
outcome cannot be achieved without taking affirmative steps to ensure 
the losers become winners.5' 
Recognition of this reality may finally be sinking in at the WTO. In a 
recent speech discussing prospects for concluding the Doha Round, 
47. The Pacific Island members of the WTO are Papua New Guinea, Fji, the Solomon 
Islands, and, as ofJuly 2007, Tonga. 
48. By at least some accounts, the Uruguay Round will have resulted in some of the world's 
poorest countries being made worse off. See, e.g., U.N. Dev. Programme, Human DevelopmentReport 
199782-84 (1997). 
49. While the increase in trade liberalization brings about an increase in global wealth, that 
increase is not evenly distributed. 
50. For example, the TRIPS agreement, which sets forth minimum standards for intellectual 
property protection, is not inherently designed to free up trade flows. Yet the costs of implement-
ing this agreement have been significant. 
51. At the national level this has occurred more within certain countries than in others. 
Brazil, for example, has done very little to redistribute the gains from trade or economic growth 
generally. Likewise in the United States the winners have generally not been taxed to compensate 
the losers. The U.S. government provides limited aid through the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Program, but this is to help displaced workers find new jobs, and does not actually provide 
compensation. Joel R. Paul, Do InternationalTrade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and 
Development? 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285, 303 n.32 (2003). Latin American or Caribbean ("LAC") 
countries have also not done much to redistribute the gains from trade. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Dev. 
Bank, Integration and Reg'l Programs Dep't, Aid for Trade: The Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank's 
Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean,at 5, WT/AFT/W/13 (May 11, 2006) (in describing 
domestic responses to trade liberalization in Latin American and Caribbean countries, the IADB 
reported that "trade opening was only rarely accompanied by mechanisms for compensating 
inevitable losers in the process and boosting the opportunities of potential winners"). By contrast, 
some of the "Asian Tigers" have implemented strategies to redistribute wealth that have in fact 
decreased the degree of inequality. Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiquingthe Globalization Critics, 1 J. 
INr'LL. & INT'L RaL. 213, 226 (2005). 
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Director-General Lamy acknowledged that: "Today it is not only global 
income growth that matters, it is also who shares in that growth and 
how. Politically, we cannot leave the question of "who gains what?" 
from trade liberalization up to market forces only."' 52 This public 
recognition marks an important first step in remedying the disconnect 
between trade liberalization and development goals within the WTO. 
Since the Members have chosen a system that increases the pie with 
the known side effect of some losing out, the system can best be 
justified by using some of the gains from trade to turn the current 
losers into winners. Different possible mechanisms for achieving this 
goal are set forth in Part IV, infra. This article does not seek to 
determine a single best way to provide compensation or other adjust-
ments. Instead it has the more modest goal of offering the concept of 
such mechanisms as a possible framework for linking the functional 
with the aspirational. In other words, we can define the WTO's func-
tional goal as increasing the pie, and its aspirational goal as ensuring all 
Members get a bigger slice than before. 
This article argues that in practice the WTO membership should 
adopt measures to ensure, through some form of direct or indirect 
compensation,53 that the losers under the current trading regime are 
made to become winners, so that they too receive a bigger slice of the 
pie.54 In short, the trade and development disconnect could be harmo-
nized if WTO members approached trade liberalization from the 
mindset that all must benefit. To the extent that this does not happen
"naturally", it should be made to happen through concerted action by 
the members. This could be compensation in the wealth transfer sense, 
or it could be some other forms of action (such as Aid for Trade and 
other forms of technical assistance) that makes members better off. For 
purposes of this article, the amount and method of compensation are 
of secondary importance; the key point is that a common mindset 
would help bridge the current divide. Whatever form of compensation 
is adopted to help those that are not benefiting from the multilateral 
trading system, the important thing is that this affirmative step be 
52. Lamy, supranote 39. 
53. In contrast, economists would leave the argument at the fact that the WTO is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient and therefore justifiable on efficiency grounds whether or not compensation is 
paid. 
54. RICHARD E.JuSr ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 45 (2004) (noting that 
economists tend to avoid the debate over what "ought to be" and accordingly do not attempt to 
answer the question of whether the potential gains that underlie Kaldor-Hicks efficiency should 
be turned into actual gains through the paying of compensation). 
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taken. Utilizing some of the wealth created by increased trade to 
balance the results that occur through market forces can bejustified on 
economic, moral, and pragmatic grounds. 
A. EconomicJustifications 
Efficiency values and distributive values are often portrayed as being 
in conflict.55 However, they need not be. Ensuring that all parties 
benefit from trade liberalization is rational from an economic perspec-
tive. Increased trade increases overall wealth.56 Thus increasing the 
ability of the poorest countries to produce and consume will lead to 
further increases in overall wealth. If sharing the wealth will facilitate 
the continuation of further trade liberalization, this is to the advantage 
of those countries that are currently the winners. 57 In other words, 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency remains efficient even when the winners decide 
in practice to compensate the losers.58 
Furthermore, to the extent the benefits of trade are shared, coun-
tries that would not have benefited will have resources to spend money 
in other members' markets and to enhance their citizens' ability to 
generate new wealth. On the flip side, the financial implications of 
failed economies spread far beyond national borders. The direct and 
indirect financial costs of third-world poverty on the developed world, 
including the cost of development assistance, the risks associated with 
political instability, and higher worldwide incidences of disease, are not 
insignificant. Ensuring that all WTO members share in the economic 
gains of trade is not only equitable, but is also good business. 
A further economic argument is grounded in public goods theory. 
55. See, e.g., Gerhart, supra note 10, at 1048. 
56. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Introduction:Mini-Symposium on DevelopingCountries in theDoha 
Round, 8J. INT'L ECON. L. 347, 351 nn.16-17 (2005) (detailing positive effects of trade on DCs, 
particularly India and China). 
57. See William R. Cline, Doha and Development, FOREIGN AFF. Dec. 2005, availableat http:// 
www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201faessay84707/william-r-cline/doha-and-development.html (cal-
culating that income gains to DCs from global free trade would be approximately $200 billion 
annually-in 1997 dollars-or over twice as much as the benefit developed countries currently 
provide through development assistance.). 
58. See, e.g., Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the 
MultilateralTradingRegime,96AM.J. INT'L L. 94,116 (2002) ("[A] genuine, mutually self-interested 
bargain may still be possible, provided that one can assure the kind of capacity for adjustment to 
the would-be 'loser' countries that would allow them to become 'winners.'"). There is no single 
economic answer to the question of degree - how much winners should compensate losers, or in 
what way. This is a question of policy and welfare preferences, which members will have to 
negotiate. See Part III, infra. 
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Public goods (which in the domestic setting could include clean air, 
street signs, or a national defense system) are characterized as being 
non-excludable (if available to anyone it is available to everyone) and 
non-rival (one person's use does not prevent another person's use). 59 
Because of these characteristics, market forces alone often do not lead 
to sufficient contributions to provide optimal levels of public goods. 60 
To avoid this market failure, government intervention through taxa-
tion or similar measures is generally required to ensure that public 
goods are not underprovided. Some have argued that a free trading 
system is a global public good, meaning a good that is experienced 
across borders, such as the eradication of an infectious disease or world 
peace. To achieve a global public good requires the cooperation of 
many, if not all, countries. 6' Thus supranational oversight is needed, 
via the WTO, to coordinate the members' agreements to open their 
markets. 62 Although this oversight already exists, the WTO arguably 
must also coordinate adjustments within the Organization to ensure 
that the system is a global public good in substance as well as form.63 
B. MoralJustifications 
The moral justification is relatively straightforward. All WTO mem-
bersjoin the Organization with the knowledge that trade liberalization 
efforts will result in a bigger pie. The pie grows as a result of the 
participation of all the members. However, as explained above, all 
members will not get a bigger slice of the pie automatically. Some slices 
will be larger than before, but others smaller. However, the bigger 
slices are big enough that the winners can compensate the losers and 
59. See, e.g., Petersmann, supranote 56, at 361 n. 57. 
60. The non-excludable and non-rival nature of public goods means that an individual can 
"free ride" on the provision of the good by someone else. Because it is rational to wait until others 
provide the good and then to enjoy it for free, market failure can result, meaning that no one 
provides the good. 
61. Other examples of global public goods include environmental sustainability and peace. 
62. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governanceat the SupranationalScale: GlobalizingAdministrative 
Law, 115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1560-61 (2006) (arguing that success in producing global public goods 
such as trade liberalization will best be achieved by ensuring the effective operation of interna-
tional policymaking institutions). 
63. See generally Ronald U. Mendoza & Chandrika Bahadur, Towards Free and FairTrade: A 
GlobalPublic Good Perspective,CHALLENGE: THE MAG. OF ECON. Air., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 21; see also 
Petersmann, supra note 56, at 361 (contrasting the explanation for international cooperation as 
being based on self-interest and power concerns with the explanation that the international rule 
of law and non-discriminatory global trading system are global public goods and are necessary 
preconditions to world peace). 
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still have more pie than they would have had without the trade 
liberalization. Accordingly, the just outcome is for the winners-who 
would not be winners but for the participation of the losers-to use a 
portion of the increased gains to compensate the losers. To put the 
argument into Rawlsian terms, if countries joined the WTO from a 
presumption of initial equality and a "veil of ignorance" as to what their 
prospects were for becoming a winner or loser under the system, they 
would insist upon a structure whereby "inequalities of wealth.. .arejus-
tified only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in 
particular for the least advantaged members ....[T] here is no injus-
tice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation 
of [members] not so fortunate is thereby improved. '64 As Rawls points 
out, a party would not (if in the original position of equality described 
above) agree to incur enduring losses so that wealth could be increased 
in the aggregate. 65 Parties would not consider the agreement fair-and 
would not agree to it- unless the promise was that all the parties would 
actually benefit from that increased wealth. To put Rawls's theory into 
economic terms, parties would only agree to a scenario that resulted in 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency if there were an accompanying agreement that 
the winners would in fact compensate the losers out of the profits. 
Although Rawls declined to extend his theory to the international 
arena, for which he was much-criticized,66 the logic seems eminently 
applicable and translatable in the WTO context. Although the idea of 
the WTO making such a value judgment will undoubtedly make some 
uncomfortable, it is important to recognize that not compensating the 




Perhaps the most compelling reason for institutionalizing methodolo-
gies to ensure all WTO members gain from trade is the pragmatic one. 
The DCs have figured out how to use their numbers within the WTO to 
their advantage and are increasingly negotiating in blocs on a strategic 
basis.68 There is widespread dissatisfaction among these countries with 
64. JOHN RAWLs,A THEORY OFJUSTICE 10-13 (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1971). 
65. Id. at 13. 
66. This seems to have been a matter of choice rather than a determination that the 
principles would not translate. For critiques of Rawls on this point, see THOMAS POGGE, WORLD 
POVERTY AND HuMAN RIGHTS 15-19 (2002); Petersmann, supra note 56. 
67. JusT ET AL., supranote 54, at 8. 
68. Such as the different negotiating groupings within the current Doha Round. 
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what they perceive to be a lack of sufficient attention to the "develop-
ment" focus the DDA is meant to have. These countries have signalled-
first in Seattle and next in Cancun-that they are unlikely to consent to 
an agreement that doesn't provide them with meaningful benefits.
69 
Thus as a practical matter, if the countries currently benefiting from 
trade liberalization want to benefit further, they are going to have to 
become more responsive to the demands of a sizeable portion of the 
WTO membership. 70 Furthermore, the current winners-particularly 
the United States and EC-would likely gain in terms of security if the 
wealth generated through trade was enjoyed more widely by the 
membership as a whole.71 
IV. OPTIONS FOR TURNING LOSERS INTO WINNERS 
This article takes the position that the winners in the WTO should 
compensate the losers up to a level where they too become winners. 
There are an infinite number of ways this could be achieved, and I do 
not seek to identify any single solution as optimal. Instead, this section 
first suggests the steps WTO members should take to minimize the 
need for compensation, then sets forth various considerations with 
respect to who should receive compensation and in what manner. 
Finally, it critiques a nonexclusive range of compensation options. 
A. Minimize the Needfor Compensation 
The need for compensation can be minimized through a combina-
tion of demand-side and supply-side measures. On the demand side, 
the more market access is provided, the more DCs will benefit. On the 
69. SeeLamy- Geneva Consensus, supranote 5, at 3 (noting the importance ofspreading the 
benefits of trade liberalization broadly "to avoid social resistance leading to a backlash against 
trade liberalization"). 
70. In addition, the longer it takes to accomplish a successful trade round, the more 
members will turn their backs on the multilateral system and pursue bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements ("FrAs"). The proliferation of FTAs is already making it harder to negotiate 
multilaterally. See, e.g., Meredith Kolsky Lewis, TheFree TradeAgreement Paradox,21 N.Z. U.L.R. 554, 
561 (2005) (linking the recent increase in FTAs to the failed Seattle and Cancun ministerials); 
Peter Sutherland, The DohaDevelopment Agenda: PoliticalChallenges to the World TradingSystem - A 
CosmopolitanPerspective,8J. INT'L. ECON. L. 363, 366 (2005) (same). 
71. Although it has been noted that some members of Al Qaeda have come from affluent 
families, the general incidence of war and terrorism historically has been greater in countries with 
weak economies. See, e.g., S. Brock Blomberg et al., Economic Conditions and Terrorism,20 EUR. J. 
Potur. ECON. 463, 463-78 (2004) (linking economic weakness with incidences of terrorism and 
discussing empirical evidence linking adverse economic circumstances with incidences of war). 
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supply side, Aid for Trade and more traditional forms of trade-related 
technical assistance can help members take advantage of new market 
access opportunities. These measures should not be considered to be 
the compensation, but rather as ways the WTO can reduce the need for 
compensation. 
1. The Demand-Side Constraints on DCs 
With respect to the demand side, in the first instance, WTO mem-
bers should reflect upon their institutional and aspirational goals and 
determine what forms of trade liberalization would and would not 
meet these dual goals. 
The most significant gains to DCs could be realized on the demand 
side through the lowering of agricultural tariffs and subsidies, doing 
away with the tariff escalation that hampers struggling countries' ability 
to export value-added products, simplifying methods for complying 
with rules of origin requirements, and through liberalizing the move-
ment of people as service suppliers under GATS Mode 4.72 Those 
problems can perhaps be characterized as "us against them" issues, in 
that the developed and less developed countries largely see, whether 
rightly or wrongly, one side's gain on these issues as the other side's 
loss. However, for purposes of minimizing the number of members 
getting a smaller slice of pie and thus requiring compensation, these 
issues need to be considered in the context of ensuring that trade 
negotiations are beneficial to all WTO Members. 
While it is the case that trade benefits are recognized unevenly, that 
unevenness can be exacerbated or ameliorated depending on the types 
of liberalization undertaken. The TRIPS Agreement, for example, 
provides little in the way of benefit to the WTO's poorest countries, and 
indeed may not even have a positive effect on aggregate global wel-
fare. 73 Yet it can be very costly to implement the legal and administra-
tive reforms necessary to comply with that Agreement. The WTO 
72. See, e.g., Cline, supranote 57 (estimating that a shift to global free trade would lift 500 
million people out of poverty within fifteen years); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 
[UNCTAD], Div. on Int'l Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities, Export Performanceand 
Its Determinants: Supply and Demand Constraints25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/27 (2004) 
(preparedly Marco Fugazza), availableat http://192.91.247.38/tab/pubs/itcdtab27_en.pdf (find-
ing that supply capacity is related to market access because "[b]etter access to international 
markets would imply higher expected returns from export activities") [hereinafter "UNCTAD 
Export Performance Report"]. 
73. See Howse, supranote 58, at 102 (observing that certain of the new WTO rules, including 
TRIPS, have more ambiguous welfare effects than do traditional rules limiting or removing tariffs 
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membership could build into the trade negotiation round process an 
analysis of what the round as a whole is aimed towards delivering in 
terms of better market access or other benefits to members. This 
analysis would give enough room for an agreement such as TRIPS that 
primarily benefits developed members to be entered into, but would 
require concessions on market access and other issues likely to gener-
ate increased trade flows for the countries that would not stand to 
benefit-and those that would in fact likely only incur expenses-as a 
result of the TRIPS-type agreement.74 While this is arguably what 
happens in practice through the negotiating process, at present this 
occurs in an us-them/give-take posture. The process could be re-
formed to make it a prerequisite for a deal that clear benefits be 
attained by the DCs, rather than this being something which members 
must fight to obtain. 
Likewise, member countries should assess concessions critically in 
light of the WTO's development objectives and the need to have all 
countries benefit. For example, members need to ensure that the 
agreement reached in Hong Kong to provide all LDCs with duty-free 
market access on 97 percent of products by 2008 is not rendered inutile 
by countries retaining protective tariffs on precisely the products LDCs 
wish to export.75 One study demonstrates that this three percent 
carve-out may lead to the exclusion of as many as 330 tariff lines.76 One 
and quotas, and that such rules cannot be justified by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as there may in fact 
not be an increase in overall welfare). 
74. Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that an impact assessment be conducted to determine how 
different proposals would affect different countries. They would also require that any package 
deal-at least in a development round-be progressive, with the benefits accruing more to DCs. See 
JOSEPH E. STIGLrrz & ANDREw CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOP-
MENT 68-77 (Oxford University Press 2005). While there would be obvious problems with 
determining in an objective way whether countries would benefit, it might aid the DCs in the 
negotiating process if there were some formalized expectation with respect to the substantive 
outcomes. 
75. This three percent loophole is big enough to protect certain sensitive industries in 
developed countries, such as textiles in the United States and leather and rice in Japan. See Daily 
Update on the Sixth Ministerial Conference, BRInGES (Int'l Centre for Trade & Sustainable Dev., 
Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 15,2005, availableathttp://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/wto-daily/ 
15_December/en051215.htm. 
76. Daily Update on the Sixth MinisterialConference, BRIDGES (Int'l Centre for trade & Sustainable 
Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 19, 2004, available at http://www.ictsd.org/ministetial/hongkong/ 
wto._daily/19 percent20December/en051219.htm. The United States has already managed to exempt 
textiles from this concession, arguing that such countries as Bangladesh and Cambodia are too 
competitive. See Briefing by Senior U.S. Gov't Officials, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 
15, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Transcripts/2005/December/ 
2007] 
GEORGETOWNJOURATAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW 
option in this regard would be to ensure that each LDC be able to 
identify a certain number of lines of tariff code-let's say ten, for 
argument's sake-that are the most important for their potential export 
success. The developed countries could then agree to bring tariffs on 
those lines to zero for exports from that particular country (in other 
words this would not be on an MFN basis across LDCs). In that way the 
members could permit protection for sensitive products while ensuring 
that the three percent clawback could not be used to essentially shut 
the LDCs out of all potential export markets. 
As a practical matter this proposal should not have strong opposi-
tion. The amount of trade impact any one LDC could have on a 
developed country through improved access on ten tariff lines would 
be quite low. However, the benefits to the LDC would be quite high. Yet 
such ideas need to be given prominence on an agenda in order to gain 
momentum. In this respect it is of critical importance to build into the 
negotiating ethos the need to ensure beneficial outcomes for DCs. 
2. The Supply-Side Constraints on DCs 
While market access is of significant importance to DCs, it alone is 
not enough to significantly enhance the export performance of some 
countries, particularly the LDCs. Studies have demonstrated that even 
schemes such as the European Union's Everything But Arms ("EBA") 
initiative and the United States' Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
("AGOA"), which give duty-free access to the vast majority of products 
from LDCs, have done little to improve these countries' export perfor-
mance. 77 Supply-side constraints are often too significant to take 
advantage of increased market access. LDCs have weak investment 
climates and it is often costly to operate a business or run a farm with 
Briefing-bySeniorUSGovernmen tOfficials,_WorldTrade_Ministerial,_HongKong_ 
ConventionExhibitionCenter.html. 
77. JOSEPH E. STIGLrTZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, A DEVELOPMENT ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS? 
8 n.24 (2005), available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2004-
CharitonStiglitz.pdf (noting the minimal effect these initiatives have had for recipient countries. 
In particular, EBA only liberalized market access on 919 products that had not previously been 
given duty-free status pursuant to other preferential arrangements, and of these products, LDCs 
exported only 80 to the EC in 2001). See alsoUNCTAD Export Performance Report, supranote 72, 
at iii (identifying poor supply side conditions as a factor constraining the ability of certain 
countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, to take advantage of foreign market access). 
[Vol. 39 
WTO WINNERS AND LOSERS 
export markets in mind.78 These countries need better roads, ports, 
and production capacity, access to technology, and government policy 
support among other things, in order to expand their production for 
export. 9 
Accordingly, trade-related aid is often discussed in the context of 
improving supply side factors. The Aid for Trade movement has led to 
vast sums of money being promised for trade-related capacity building 
and other efforts to assist countries in taking advantage of market 
.access opportunities.80 As outlined in Part II, supra, the Aid for Trade 
initiative is designed to provide significant levels of supply-side assis-
tance to LDCs and certain developing countries. In addition to Aid for 
Trade, there are at present a variety of other initiatives underway to 
help DCs integrate themselves further into the world trading system. 
Two that are of particular importance are discussed briefly below. 
8 1 
a. The IntegratedFrameworkfor Trade-relatedTechnical Assistance to 
Least-Developed Countries 
The first initiative is the Integrated Framework for Trade-related 
Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries ("IF"), which was 
launched at the December 1996 Singapore Ministerial Meeting. The IF 
brings together six agencies- the IMF, World Bank, WTO, U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), the International 
Trade Centre ("ITC" - the technical cooperation agency of UNCTAD 
and the WTO) and the U.N. Development Program ("UNDP")- to 
78. See Bernard Hoekman, Paper Presented at Trade Meeting: Assessment of the Hong Kong 
Round 1: Moving Forward After Hong Kong: Beyond Market Access, (Feb. 2-3, 2006), available at 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/programs/item.cfm?prid=24&iyid=5&itid=795. 
79. SeeJoseph E. Stiglitz &Andrew Charlton, Aid for Trade: A report for the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, Presented at Conference on Trade and Development 18 (Mar. 21-22, 2006) available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/trade/2006/03tradeaid.pdf. 
80. The EC, Japan, and United States have each announced very significant planned 
spending on Aid for Trade over the next several years. At the Hong Kong Ministerial the EC 
announced planned spending of $2.4 billion a year by 2010. The United States indicated its 
intention to reach $2.7 billion per year in Aid for Trade grants by 2010. AndJapan committed to 
spending $10 billion over three years. It is unclear how much of these pledges represent funds 
already committed in other contexts. See AGENCY FOR INT'L TRADE INFO & COOPERATION, BACK-
GROUND NOTE: AlD FOR TRADE: A MOVING TARGET (2006), availableat http://www.odi.org.uk/iedg/ 
Projects/Aid4trade files/aitic.pdf. 
81. Donor countries and organizations have also pledged money through the WB and IMF 
Aid for Trade initiative and to the DDA Global Trust Fund, which also provides trade-related 
technical assistance, particularly to LDCs and countries without representation in Geneva. 
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collaborate with donors to ensure greater coherence.82 
The IF has four main processes: 1) Awareness, which entails building 
on the importance of trade for development; 2) Diagnostic Trade 
Integration Studies ("DTIS") to identify constraints to traders, sectors 
of greatest export potential, and a plan of action for integrating into 
the global trading system; 3) Integrating the plan of action into the 
national development plan, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Process ("PRSP"); and 4) Implementation of a plan of action in 
partnership with the development cooperation community. 
The concept is that through multiple agencies coordinating there 
will be more coherence, less waste, and less overlap in the provision of 
trade-related technical assistance. 
b. JointIntegratedTechnicalAssistance Programme 
The second initiative is the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance 
Programme ('JITAP"), which was launched by the WTO, UNCTAD 
and the ITC to provide technical assistance to selected LDCs. At 
present all of the participating countries are in Africa.8 3 Initially there 
were eight countries participating and this has now been expanded to 
include an additional eight. The focus of JITAP is primarily capacity 
building to help participating countries with the following: 
" Participate in the World Trade Organization; 
* Integrate into the new Multilateral Trading System; and 
* Take advantage of new trade opportunities arising from the global-
ization ofworld markets. 
Through this program, the WTO has provided reference centers in 
the selected countries.84 JITAP operates through a Common Trust 
Fund ("CTF") funded by donor countries. The CTF operates through 
two windows. Window one, which started with three countries and 
expanded to 14 in 2003, applies donor contributions towards diagnos-
tic studies, program development, and other preliminary activities in 
needy countries. For window two, up to $1 million in bridging funding 
can be provided for priority needs in specific countries. Window two 
activities only take place once case resources have actually been re-
82. Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Save Developing 
Countries? in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE DOHA ROUND: WTO DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES AND 
NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES 185, 204 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 
2005). 
83. See joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program General Information, available at 
http://www.jitap.org/info-e.htm. 
84. Shaffer, supranote 82, at 204-05. 
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ceived from donors. 85 Although this program has been well received, 
there have been some implementation problems. In particular, follow-
ing the window one diagnostic studies, the LDCs did not receive the 
window two funding from donor organizations that had been antici-
pated.86 
3. Improving the Supply-Side 
The WTO has taken a number of steps in recent years to address 
supply-side capacity of LDC and DC members, including trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity programs. This section proposes some 
further measures the WTO could take institutionally with the assistance 
of available funds from Aid for Trade that would enhance DCs' trade 
performance and WTO participation. 
a. Additional Technical Assistance and CapacityBuilding 
i. More Representation in Geneva 
Within its traditional competence, the WTO could provide funding 
to give the LDCs and other needy countries more representation in 
Geneva. There is always much talk about ownership and capacity 
building, and many resources have been spent on capacity building 
programs. But ownership would be greatly strengthened if every WTO 
member had some real opportunity to participate in Geneva.87 This is a 
problem because there are a number of countries that currently have 
no representation at all in Geneva and others that have only a skeleton 
staff of one or possibly two individuals. None of the Pacific Islands (PI) 
WTO members (PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga) or observers 
(Samoa, Vanuatu) has permanent representation. The cost, financially 
and in terms of resources, is too high. The WTO has addressed this 
problem in part by helping to establish the PI Forum Representative 
Office in Geneva, which has recently started facilitating rotating six 
month placements in Geneva for PI trade officials. Nonetheless, most 
85. SeeJoint Integrated Technical Assistance Programe, supra note 83. 
86. The World Bank blames donors for not coming through. Id. at 210 & n.105. 
87. See Ann Capling, The MultilateralTradingSystem atRisk? Three Challenges to the World Trade 
Organization,in THE WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE 37, 52-53 
(Ross P. Buckley ed., 2003) (noting that many developing and least-developed countries have no 
delegation in Geneva or only a skeleton staff ofone or two people). 
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of the countries have no direct participation most of the time."8 The 
Consultative Board report acknowledges that WTO members can not 
fully participate without Geneva representation, but frames the prob-
lem more in terms of the poorest countries' failure in not having 
officials in Geneva rather than as a significant resource problem.89 
The WTO could address this problem in a number of ways. One 
option would be, for each country not currently represented, to fund a 
full-time representative to live in Geneva. But there are also more 
cost-effective options. One of these would be to expand the PI Forum 
Representative Office program to fund multiple individuals from each 
of the regions that currently do not have full representation. So there 
would be, for example, housing for x representatives from Africa, x 
from the Caribbean, and x from the Pacific, and those countries could 
rotate representatives. Another option would be to install and maintain 
internet/WAN connections in the relevant ministries of the PI and 
other low-income members such that these countries would have 
closed circuit access in their relevant ministries to WTO proceedings 
and could participate via video conference. This way, even if Geneva 
representation is not always possible financially or in terms of physical 
resources, at least countries could meaningfully participate in WTO 
proceedings. 90 
ii. E-training 
The second suggestion follows on the video conference concept 
described above, but is in the context of providing training. Capacity 
building through training has been fairly labor intensive thus far. More 
people could be trained, however, and in a more timely fashion 
through the addition of videoconference training sessions in which 
officials and other interested parties from multiple countries could 
participate. At present, regional training sessions only make it to 
regions such as the South Pacific or the Caribbean every few years. If 
instead there were sessions held by time zone band and by video 
conference, more training would be available and accessible to the 
countries that don't have significant representation in Geneva. Since 
88. A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries also lack permanent representa-
tion in Geneva. See Aid for Trade Task Force, Communicationfrom the Inter-AmericanDevelopment 
Bank IntegrationandRegionalProgrammesDepartment,at 4, WT/AFT/W/13 (May 24,2006). 
89. See McRae, supranote 17, at 607; Consultative Board Report, supranote 16. 
90. International organizations could work together to provide such connectivity, which 
could then be used forvirtual participation in the meetings ofvarious organizations, including the 
World Bank and IMF as well as the WTO. 
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these sessions generally go over a number of days, questions could be 
handled by having them be submitted via e-mail at the end of each day, 
and then the presenters could answer them on the last day, or answer 
questions from each region in turn. 
These two technology-related initiatives could be pursued jointly 
with the World Bank and IMF such that access is also provided to 
relevant meetings and trainings conducted by those organizations. 91 
iii. ExpandingJITAP 
A further step the WTO could take to enhance technical assistance 
would be to help (through funding and otherwise) expand the JITAP 
to other LDCs. Logical next steps would be to have a Caribbean 
initiative and a South Pacific one. 
b. IncreasingCoherence 
The second category of measures the WTO could take would be 
designed to increase coherence in the trade-related technical assis-
tance process. As noted above, the IF is designed in part to minimize 
duplication and to provide the right training to the right recipients. 
Likewise, the WTO and OECD secretariats launched a DDA Trade 
Capacity Building Database in 2002 to assist development and trade 
policy communities in achieving higher levels of coordination and 
coherence, information sharing, and avoiding duplication. Notwith-
standing these efforts, something further is necessary to increase 
coordination and coherence. A small personal anecdote illustrates the 
point. 
In 2005 a colleague and I were funded by the New Zealand aid 
agency, NZ AID to provide Vietnam with capacity-building workshops 
on WTO issues. On our first day ofworkshops in Hanoi, we learned that 
in the conference room adjacent to ours, a team of Australian lawyers-
funded by an Australian government agency-was providing training on 
antidumping law. While our sessions did not overlap significantly in 
substance, they easily could have. We had not known about the 
Australian training nor they of ours. Our primary contact at the New 
Zealand Embassy also knew nothing of the other training. Ifit had been 
91. The WTO has recently initiated an online distance learning project entitled "WTO 
eTraining." See generally the Committee on Trade and Development's 2007 Technical Assistance 
Training Plan WT/COMTD/W/151, availableathttp://www.wto.org/engsh/tratop-e/devel-e/ 
teccope/tct e.htm. This is a positive development but does not obviate the need for other forms 
of remote-access training. 
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requested, we could have included antidumping in our training. Pre-
sumably there were attendees at each of the workshops that would have 
benefited from going to the other one. This is not an isolated phenom-
enon. When this point was raised at a recent WTO conference, several 
attendees chuckled knowingly and indicated that they too had recently 
provided training in Vietnam, in one case a program lasting several 
months. Some of this training has clearly overlapped, and it is unlikely 
that Vietnam is alone in this regard. 
As such it would be valuable both for the recipients of training and 
donors if there were better, or perhaps more accessible, information 
exchange. Although some bilateral assistance is reported in the OECD/ 
WTO database, this is not done comprehensively. It would therefore 
cut down on duplicative efforts to have a common repository of 
information that donors should contribute to when they have provided 
training and can access when discussing what training will be provided. 
While one can currently access some information through the OECD/ 
WTO database, it is at a macro level and needs to be more specific. 
c. Adjustment Assistance 
A further area in which the WTO could act is in adjustment assis-
tance. There is a cost-benefit problem of implementing some of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements for the smallest and poorest WTO mem-
bers. Implementing certain agreements-particularly TRIPS and the 
SPS and TBT Agreements-are resource intensive. This is problematic 
for small economies because they will not recognize substantial gains 
from these agreements, at least not in the short run, and therefore they 
do not want to have to implement them.9 2 For example, as ofJanuary 
2000 it was estimated that up to ninety WTO Members had failed to 
bring their domestic regulations and facilities into compliance with the 
SPS, customs valuation, and TRIPS agreements. This is unsurprising 
given the significant investments needed in some instances to upgrade 
existing mechanisms.93 The high cost of meeting regulatory require-
ments such as health and safety standards may also prevent DCs from 
taking advantage of market access opportunities.94 
92. See Bernard Hoekrnan, Operationalizingthe Concept ofPolicy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special 
andDifferentialTreatment,8J. INT'L ECON. L. 405, 407 (2005). 
93. Stiglitz & Charlton, supra note 79, at 16 n.29. For example, Hungary spent over $40 
million to improve the sanitation levels in its slaughterhouses, and Mexico expended over $30 
million to update its intellectual property laws. Id. 
94. Hoekmnan, supranote 92, at 410. 
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In addition, for subsistence economies in particular, there is a 
disincentive to lower tariffs quickly because these countries rely rela-
tively heavily upon tariff revenue. 
In light of these problems, the WTO could take various steps to 
facilitate the adjustment burden on the LDCs and small economy 
members. 
i. Compensate for Lost Tariff Revenue 
The LDCs and small countries for which tariff revenue has histori-
cally been important could be compensated for the tariff revenue they 
will forego upon reducing tariffs. For many countries, including LDCs 
and the smaller island members, tariffs have provided an important 
component of national income. As such these countries are particularly 
reluctant to lower their tariffs and want to prolong the tariff reduction 
process as long as possible. However, these countries also have the 
potential to recognize meaningful gains upon the reduction of their 
tariffs. First, consumers will benefit from lower prices. Second, produc-
ers within the country will benefit from cheaper inputs. And third, the 
exporting countries-which are often LDCs as well-will benefit from 
increased trade floes. Accordingly it is worthwhile to encourage LDCs 
to reduce their tariffs more expeditiously. For this reason LDCs that 
reduce their tariff rates significantly and quickly could receive some 
form of compensation for the foregone revenue. This would allow the 
LDCs' consumers and producers to benefit immediately from lower 
prices but would not strip the country of important income. This aid 
could be in the form of a direct cash transfer, for it is cash into the 
governments' coffers that is being sacrificed. While there are obviously 
concerns about corruption and other reasons leading donors to be 
hesitant about untied aid, for this purpose-replacing foregone tariff 
revenue-the money arguably should be untied. Although this may not 
be politically feasible, it must be recognized that the more conditions 
that are put on aid to replace tariff revenue, the less willing the LDCs 
will be to lower tariffs more quickly and substantially. 
ii. Identify economies of scale to reduce adjustment costs 
The WTO could take steps to help countries identify economies of 
scale to reduce their adjustment costs. For example, if a group of 
countries in a region worked together, they could perhaps develop a 
unified SPS procedure. Thus the Pacific Island countries could agree 
that all agricultural exports would go through an agreed inspection 
process in Fiji which they would all fund so that each small country did 
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not have to have its own SPS facilities. The WTO could facilitate this 
process through regional studies modeled on the current trade policy 
review procedure or through coordinated studies with another organi-
zation such as the International Trade Centre. 
B. Determine Who Will Compensate Whom 
Once members have institutionalized a methodology for minimizing 
the number of losers through demand-side and supply-side measures, 
there will still-because perfect market conditions do not exist-be 
members at any given time that are not benefiting from trade liberaliza-
tion. The next question therefore is who should compensate whom. 
Identifying the winners and losers may not be as straightforward as it 
may seem. For example, the United States and European Union would 
consider themselves to be making concessions if they agreed to cuts in 
agricultural subsidies and tariffs. Yet the biggest financial beneficiaries 
of such cuts would likely be the United States and EC themselves, as 
they would no longer be spending vast sums of money on these 
trade-distorting measures. One option therefore would be not to try to 
determine exact winners and losers, but instead to treat all developed 
countries as winners and all LDCs as losers. This would be highly 
inexact, however. It would also have the disadvantage of conceptually 
likening the compensation to a form of development aid. Rather than 
viewing the compensation as aid, or as a give away, it should be viewed 
as an appropriate mechanism to redress and therefore validate the 
inherent imbalances in the system. As such, it would be preferable to 
attempt to determine a mechanism that would measure winners and 
losers according to agreed-upon criteria. A further issue that would 
need to be resolved is whether all winners would contribute, and if so, 
would they contribute at equal rates. One possibility would be for 
winners to contribute progressively more based on their level of 
development. Another would be for DCs to contribute a much smaller, 
token percentage- or a modest flat fee- even if they were deemed to be 
major winners. Likewise, perhaps the LDCs and poorer DCs would not 
contribute even if they were showing gains from trade due to their 
current economic status and relative disadvantage in the global eco-
nomic order. 
Winners could be measured by increases in GDP due to trade over a 
period of time, and likewise for losers. This determination would 
encompass factors such as revenue lost as a result of lowering tariffs and 
could include adjustments to take into account trade distorting mea-
sures countries employ. Thus for example if a country were a net 
exporter but granted significant subsidies, it would be treated as a 
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bigger winner and thus be expected to contribute a higher amount 
than a net exporter that gave no subsidies. 
C. Determinethe Form of Compensation 
Compensation could take a variety of forms, ranging from trade-
related technical assistance to increased market access, to direct or 
indirect monetary transfers. 
Indirect technical assistance is not an optimal form of compensation 
for a few reasons. First, the less direct compensation is, the more it will 
take to turn a loser into a winner. Second, winners in the WTO are not 
constrained by other WTO members in how they use their GDP; 
likewise countries that are made winners indirectly also should not be 
so constrained. Third, this approach would be duplicative of what the 
WTO is and should be doing already in the form of providing trade-
related technical assistance, and would also be duplicative of efforts 
that will be undertaken pursuant to Aid for Trade. The compensation 
mechanism ideally should be a means unto itself, rather than being 
linked to supply-side assistance measures. 
It could be argued that the WTO already incorporates adjustments to 
reflect the fact that there are winners and losers, particularly through 
the principle of special and differential treatment. 95 However, special 
and differential treatment is at best an incomplete solution. In its 
current form, the preferential market access that developed countries 
provide to LDCs (and in some cases to developing countries), often 
excludes the sectors of most importance to the purported recipients. 
Furthermore, preferential schemes pursuant to the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences often impose significant conditions before the 
benefits can be realized. 96 But more generally, whether one considers 
special and differential treatment to be helpful or harmful to DCs, this 
is a question that goes to the best ways to minimize the number of 
losers, not the question of how to compensate the losers. 
A related issue is whether compensation should be provided for 
preference erosion. In the longer term, special and differential treat-
ment, even when implemented without exceptions, will be less and less 
95. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Building aJust Trade Order for a New Millenium, 33 GEO. WASH. 
INT'L L. REv. 1015, 1051-52 (2001) (identifying special and differential treatment as the "corner-
stone" to the WTO's approach to addressing inequality). 
96. For additional problems with special and differential treatment, see generally Frank J. 
Garcia, Trade and Inequality: EconomicJustice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 975 
(2000). 
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meaningful as overall tariff rates come down. Some have therefore 
suggested that members should compensate DCs for the decrease in 
preferential access resulting from MFN-consistent trade liberaliza-
tion.9 7 Others do not believe DCs should be compensated for prefer-
ence erosion because the countries who will suffer from preference 
erosion are not the countries most in need of assistance. It also can be 
argued that trade liberalization itself will result in benefits to LDCs that 
exceed the disadvantageous effects of preference erosion. 98 The issue 
of compensation for preference erosion is perhaps best addressed not 
in the context of compensating losers until they become winners, but 
rather in the context of determining whether or not a member is a 
loser at any given time. 
Direct transfers of money would provide the most utility to recipient 
members, but would raise concerns about corruption and the potential 
for misuse. Accordingly, perhaps the best solution would be one 
whereby the losers would be given compensation in the form of money, 
but the money would be spent on projects or items identified by the 
loser countries with few limitations. In this way, there could be some 
controls to ensure the money wasn't going straight into the pockets of 
corrupt officials, but the losers would still maintain a significant degree 
of autonomy over how to use the compensation. 
D. DetermineHow Much Compensation 
Next, there needs to be agreement as to how much the winners 
should pay. This again is an issue for which there is no right answer, so 
long as the winners pay enough for the losers to also become winners. 
That said, the compensation should be a relatively small percentage of 
97. Some have argued that because further liberalization will have an adverse effect on those 
currently benefiting from preferences, the "obvious" solution is to compensate those suffering 
preference erosion through some sort of transfer mechanism. See, e.g., International Monetary 
Fund [IMF], IMF WorkingPaper:The WJ'O and thePoorestCountries: The Stark Reality,at 3-4, IMF Doc. 
WP/04/81 (May 2004) (preparedby Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian), availableat http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wpO481.pdf; Bernard Hoekman & Susan Prowse, Eco-
nomicPolicyResponses to PreferenceErosion:FromTradeas Aid to Aidfor Trade16 (World Bank, Working 
Paper No. 3721, 2005); SHEILA PAGE & PETER KLEEN, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 16-17 (2004). available at http:// 
www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/40725_GI percent20Dev percent2OStud percent202.pdf (suggesting 
that, because MFN-based liberalization is a public good, compensating DCs in this fashion should 
not be considered aid but rather as a part ofthe trade liberalization process. Page and Kleen argue 
that a compensation fund could be operated out of the WTO, with fuhding allocated uncondition-
ally to Members on the basis of their lost preferential access). 
98. Cline, supranote 57. 
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the overall benefits from trade, such that incentives to export would 
still be high, and those not faring well in the system would still have an 
incentive to try to improve their performance. This would create a 
win-win situation whereby both winners and losers would stand to gain 
from increases in international trade. 
Stiglitz and Charlton propose a three-part commitment, with the 
advanced industrial countries contributing 0.05 percent of their GDP 
to a new aid-for-trade facility, the Global Trade Facility, which would be 
administered by an independent secretariat within UNCTAD.99 In 
addition, advanced industrial countries would be expected to commit a 
small percentage of the value of their exports to LDCs as additional 
payments. Finally, there would be a further commitment of five percent 
of the value of agricultural subsidies and 15 percent of arms sales to 
DCs. 100 
Stiglitz and Charlton go on to propose that middle-income countries 
also contribute to the LDCs, but with their contribution being at a 
significantly lower rate, perhaps 25 or 50 percent that of the wealthiest 
countries. 101 
The third requirement seems impractical as developed countries are 
unlikely to agree to such a calculus. More palatable could be agreeing, 
in the context of the Doha negotiations, to special remedies DCs could 
utilise to offset the impact of agricultural subsidies. Arms sales, while 
undeniably a political problem, are not an appropriate linkage for the 
provision of additional aid. The rationale behind the second require-
ment is not immediately clear. Countries that benefit from exporting 
will be contributing accordingly through the first mechanism. Requir-
ing net exporters to pay more does not make sense, particularly if there 
is no nexus between the exports and the provision of any governmental 
aids to promote those exports. For example, New Zealand is a net 
exporter of agricultural products but grants no governmental subsidies 
or other support to its agricultural sector. Why should New Zealand 
have to pay an additional amount based on its fairly traded exports, 
when Japan, which imposes significant tariffs on agricultural imports, 
would not have to pay an additional amount?
10 2 
99. Stiglitz & Charlton, supranote 79, at 24. 
100. Id. at 25. 
101. Id. Stiglitz and Charlton further suggest that middle-income countries could provide 
some of their assistance as in-kind aid rather than in financial contributions. See id. 
102. A further problem with Stiglitz and Charlton's scheme is the suggestion that the 
governance structure for the GTF comprise a board of 24 with only eight seats for the advanced 
industrial countries (and eight each for LDCs and middle income countries). Id. at 24. While it is 
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Nonetheless, the first requirement has some appeal. Without express-
ing any view as to the appropriateness of the formula proposed, one 
can see the draw of linking commitments to GDP. A better formulation 
however would be one that explicitly linked commitments to the gains 
from global trade.1 0 3 Likewise, a preferable compensation scheme 
would be one that wasn't linked to the provision of Aid for Trade or 
technical assistance but which instead was simply compensation.
* ** 
Pascal Lamy's recent speech recognizing the necessity of going 
beyond market forces to ensure that the gains from trade are realized 
equitably may represent the beginnings of a major shift in the WTO's 
institutional mindset. Such a shift would be welcome and timely. The 
WTO is currently floundering in its efforts to satisfy its aspirational 
goals while remaining true to its focus on opening markets. To move 
forward with the buy-in of all members, including the most vulnerable, 
the WTO membership needs to broaden its focus beyond merely 
expanding the size of the pie to also ensuring that each member 
receives a bigger slice. By adopting the Kaldor-Hicks framework and 
committing to actually taking some of the gains from trade to make the 
losers into winners, the WTO could go a long way towards reconciling 
its trade promotion and development objectives. 
desirable to have a structure that gives the recipients more control over the aid process than exists 
in, for example, the IMF, it seems highly unlikely that the major sources of the aid are going to 
agree to effectively cede all control over how that aid is distributed. 
103. Stiglitz and Charlton state that commitments should be tied to the benefits attained 
through global trade, with particular focus on trade with DCs. However, the formulation based on 
GDP is not in fact directly linked to trade gains. See id. at 25. 
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